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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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Results for social impact bonds
5 results foundAuthor: Disley, Emma Title: Phase 2 report from the payment by results Social Impact Bond pilot at HMP Peterborough Summary: At a time when government finances are stretched there is growing interest in finding new ways to fund public services. One new funding model currently being tested is a Social Impact Bond (SIB). A SIB is a form of payment by results in which funding is obtained from private investors to pay for interventions to improve social outcomes. If these interventions are effective, this should result in savings to government and wider benefits to society. As part of a SIB, the government agrees to pay a proportion of these savings back to the investors. If outcomes do not improve, investors do not receive a return on their investment. In September 2010 the first ever SIB was launched in the UK. Approximately L5 million was invested by private individuals and charities is being used to pay for interventions for offenders discharged after serving short prison sentences (less than 12 months) at HMP Peterborough, a prison in eastern England. RAND Europe has been commissioned to evaluate the development, implementation and operation of this first ever SIB. This report is the second from the independent evaluation. Details: London: Ministry of Justice, 2014. 62p., app. Source: Internet Resource: Ministry of Justice Analytical Series: Accessed April 23, 2015 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/phase-2-report-from-the-payment-by-results-social-impact-bond-pilot-at-hmp-peterborough Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/phase-2-report-from-the-payment-by-results-social-impact-bond-pilot-at-hmp-peterborough Shelf Number: 135370 Keywords: Costs of Criminal Justice (U.K.)InterventionsPrisoner ReentryRecidivismSocial Impact Bonds |
Author: Disley, Emma Title: The payment by results Social Impact Bond pilot at HMP Peterborough: final process evaluation report Summary: Between 2010 and 2015, an intervention called the One Service operated at Peterborough Prison. This service provided 'through-the-gate' and post-release support to adult male offenders released from HMP Peterborough who had served prison sentences of less than 12 months, with an aim of reducing reoffending. The through-the-gate support provided by the One Service involved contacting offenders before release in order to introduce case workers, assess needs, and plan resettlement activities. The One Service then implemented these plans by working with offenders for up to 12 months following their release. If an offender returned to prison within this period, the One Service aimed to ensure that support services continued back in prison. The One Service was funded through a financing mechanism known as a Social Impact Bond (SIB), a form of payment by results. This is where private, non-government investors pay for an intervention, and if certain results are achieved, are paid back their initial investment plus an additional return on that investment.1 In the Peterborough SIB, the Ministry of Justice, supported by the Big Lottery Fund, entered into an agreement to pay a return to investors if targets for reducing reconvictions were achieved. This pilot was the first SIB to be established worldwide. The Peterborough SIB pilot was originally intended to operate until 2017, funding the delivery of the One Service to three cohorts of around 1,000 prisoners released from the prison. Support from the One Service was available to cohort members for a period of up to 12 months post-release, and engagement was on a voluntary basis. While the pilot operated on a payment by results basis under the SIB model for the first two cohorts of released prisoners, a third cohort received One Service support under a 'fee-for-service' arrangement, rather than under the original SIB funded payment by results model. This change to the model was due to the roll-out of Transforming Rehabilitation reforms to probation, which introduced mandatory statutory supervision for short-sentenced offenders - the target group for the Peterborough pilot - and also included a payment by results funding mechanism to incentivise providers to reduce reoffending. This meant that while the pilot was concluded early in order to avoid any duplication in services to the same population, the alternative fee-for-service funding arrangement for the third cohort enabled the pilot to continue operating until the new Community Rehabilitation Company (CRC) providers implemented their approach to rehabilitation. This report presents findings from a process evaluation of the Peterborough pilot, commissioned by the Ministry of Justice in 2010. It is the third and final output from the process evaluation, and addresses the following five research questions: 1. How, if at all, did the pilot lead to better outcomes of reduced reoffending (including the role played by voluntary and community sector organisations and partner agencies)? 2. What wider costs and benefits, if any, do stakeholders feel were incurred through the implementation of the SIB? 3. To what extent did stakeholders feel that the SIB led to greater innovation and/or efficiency? 4. What were the strengths and weaknesses of the SIB contractual model as implemented? 5. What key messages can be taken from the Peterborough pilot that offer useful learning points for future payment by results models and SIBs? Details: London: Ministry of Justice, 2015. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Ministry of Justice Analytical Series: Accessed February 2, 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/486512/social-impact-bond-pilot-peterborough-report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/486512/social-impact-bond-pilot-peterborough-report.pdf Shelf Number: 137742 Keywords: Costs of Criminal Justice (U.K.) Interventions Prisoner Reentry Recidivism RehabilitationSocial Impact Bonds |
Author: McKay, Kyle A. Title: Evaluating Social Impact Bonds as a New Reentry Financing Mechanism: A Case Study on Reentry Programming in Maryland Summary: Social impact bonds (SIBs) represent a relatively new concept for financing and contracting for the delivery of social service programs. They are designed with the intention of shifting the financial risk of performance-based payments from providers onto investors. This allows governments to, in theory, increase the portion of funding linked to the achievement of an outcome without damaging the funding of service providers. Although actual bonds are not typically issued, the government contracts with investors, a program manager, and nonprofit service providers for a SIB program. If an independent evaluator finds that the SIB program produced outcomes equal to or greater than the targeted levels, then the government reimburses the investors for their capital, along with a return on investment. In the event that the program does not produce the targeted outcomes, then the investors receive no compensation from the government and lose their capital investment. The Department of Legislative Services (DLS) has conducted a review of the feasibility, potential benefits, and risks associated with financing reentry programs using SIBs. Reentry programs are of particular interest to the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) based on its mission. Reentry programs are also generally considered a strong candidate for SIBs due to the potential for large cost savings to the government through the successful reduction of re-imprisonment. Based on the benefits commonly associated with SIBs, DLS evaluated the potential of SIBs to generate cost savings, help finance social programs, shift outcome risk, increase innovation in reentry programming, and build more rigorous evidence for policy decisions. Even when using a set of highly optimistic assumptions, it is clear that pilot reentry programs cannot self-finance their operations. Because pilot programs cannot create a large enough reduction in demand to close a facility, the cost dynamics are driven by much smaller marginal cost savings. As a result, a program that produces a 10% reduction in recidivism for 250 prisoners per year over five years will only result in minimal avoided imprisonment costs. Before including the cost of direct services, the fixed costs of designing the contract, compensating a third-party intermediary, and conducting an independent evaluation, at $700,000 collectively, would alone exceed the fiscal benefits. Including service costs of $2,500 per participant, the program would result in a net fiscal impact of -$3.9 million. Doubling the size or assumed effectiveness of the program would not result in a positive net fiscal impact. These results indicate that the additional costs of a SIB program cannot be justified by offsetting savings. Other potential benefits do not justify the cost or complexity of a SIB program either. Given the difficulty of linking the evaluation of a social program to a highly complex contract centered on an outcome payment, the government may actually increase its operational risks in undertaking a SIB. The government would also need to budget upfront for the contingent liabilities of outcome payments. As a result, a SIB program would increase both budgetary pressure and operational risks. Reentry programs can have great social value independent of their fiscal impact. The decision to finance them should be made independent of whether or not they can be self-financed through cost savings and a SIB mechanism. Because they are especially valuable and effective when integrated and combined with larger scale policies aimed at reducing recidivism and increasing public safety, DLS recommends that DPSCS continue to directly finance reentry programs while pursuing other organizational and policy changes likely to have greater impacts while posing less risk than a SIB financed program. Details: Annapolis, MD: Maryland Department of Legislative Services, Office of Policy Analysis, 2013. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 17, 2017 at: http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/Pubs/BudgetFiscal/2013-Evaluating-Social-Impact-Bonds.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/Pubs/BudgetFiscal/2013-Evaluating-Social-Impact-Bonds.pdf Shelf Number: 146668 Keywords: Criminal Justice FundingPartnershipsPrisoner ReentryPrivate InvestmentSocial Impact Bonds |
Author: Eames, Sandra Title: A Review of Social Impact Bonds: Financing Social Service Programs through Public-Private Partnerships Summary: The Austin/Travis County Reentry Roundtable (A/TCRRT) works to bring partners and stakeholders together to strategically develop systemic changes that help formerly incarcerated individuals reintegrate into the community. The Roundtable is considering the potential of social impact bonds (SIBs) as a financing mechanism for services to individuals experiencing criminal justice reentry barriers. Social impacts bonds, also known as Pay for Success or Pay for Performance, are an innovative financing mechanism implemented to address current social issues through public and private partnerships. A SIB is the arrangement among one or more government entities and an external organization, or service provider, in which the government specifies an outcome to be achieved by the external organization. Financial investors fund the project. An intermediary organization is often contracted to secure the financial investors and manage the transfer of funds. The government agrees to pay a specified amount to the investors at a predetermined time if the outcome is achieved. If the outcome is not achieved, the government does not pay for the contracted services. This report provides a brief history of the SIB concept and documents current SIB initiatives and legislative efforts within the United States. Given the recent emergence of SIBs in the United States, there is a lack of conclusive evidence on their effectiveness. The report also presents the advantages and disadvantages of SIBs and offers recommendations for A/TCRRT based on the current knowledge that is available. Details: Austin, TX: Austin/Travis County Reentry Roundtable, 2014. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 17, 2017 at: http://www.reentryroundtable.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/A-Review-of-Social-Impact-Bonds-Final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.reentryroundtable.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/A-Review-of-Social-Impact-Bonds-Final.pdf Shelf Number: 141075 Keywords: Criminal Justice Funding Partnerships Private Investment Recidivism Reoffending Social Impact Bonds |
Author: Jolliffe, Darrick Title: Peterborough Social Impact Bond: Final Report on Cohort 1 Analysis Summary: This report has two main purposes: firstly to validate the Propensity Score Matching methodology that was tested and agreed in March 2012 (see Cave et al., 2012) for the first cohort of offenders in the Peterborough Social Impact Bond pilot, under which the One Service provided interventions for adult males before and after being discharged from custodial sentences of less than 12 months; and secondly to assess reconviction data to determine whether any payment is due to investors for the first cohort. The payment mechanism is designed to ensure that MoJ pays investors, represented in this case by Social Finance (SF), only when a minimum of 10% reduction in reconvictions per cohort or a 7.5% reduction across all cohorts has occurred. The Independent Assessors, comprising analysts from QinetiQ and the University of Leicester and University of Greenwich, established and tested a method for comparing offenders released from HMP Peterborough with other comparable offenders released from other prisons in a 'dry run', based on 2008 data taken from the prisoner record system (LIDS) and from criminal records information held on the Police National Computer (PNC) (see Cave et al., 2012). The analyses in this report attempts to replicate the above approach with the first cohort of those who experienced the through-the-gates intervention at HMP Peterborough. Key findings The current study has matched 936 offenders released from Peterborough with 9,360 released from other prisons on 36 out of 38 variables. The Independent Assessors have concluded that the model is sufficiently accurate and robust to support a reconviction analysis. The analysis shows that there was a 8.39% reduction in reoffending rates within the Peterborough Cohort 1, which is insufficient totrigger payment for the first cohort. Other findings The PSM Model: The 936 men released from HMP Peterborough and 9,360 released from other prisons were successfully matched on the propensity score in terms of demographic and criminal history variables. Two differences in nature of index offence remained. However, it is reasonable to conclude that this may be due to chance as we would expect to find one statistically significant result by chance at the p<.05 level for every 20 statistical tests conducted (Cave et al., 2012) and in this case there were 2 in 38. Constructing the PSM model: Nine Peterborough cases were excluded from the PSM model because the nature of their offence remained uncertain, despite the best efforts of SF and the MoJ. 30 (3.2%) of the 936 were men on whom SF held data but MoJ did not. There is often attrition when comparisons are made using administrative data because of data quality and completeness. Replicating the method: It was not possible to precisely replicate the approach adopted in the 'dry run' because of data quality issues, including missing data pertaining to the type of offence. Although Social Finance and the MoJ made efforts to fill these gaps, some cases still had to be excluded because of missing data. There were also changes to the content and format of databases held by the MoJ. Agreeing cases for inclusion: The MoJ and SF views of who had been, and who should have been, helped in Peterborough differed. This had implications for the number of cases included in the Peterborough sample and constructing the Comparison Group. In the 'dry run' the Independent Assessors confirmed that only those who should be included in the Intervention and Comparison groups were included. For the current exercise the MoJ performed this task, thus the number of cases which were excluded cannot be reported upon, nor can the impact this had on the current sample be compared with that of the 2008 sample. For the benefit of future analysis of the second cohort of the Peterborough Social Impact Bond and of other projects, it should be noted that it took 11 months to agree the sample and obtain all the data needed to begin analysis. Comparability of those released from Peterborough and other prisons prior to matching: Following data cleaning, the sample for analysis comprised 945 individuals from Peterborough and 31,207 from other prisons. Comparing these samples prior to matching showed that those released from Peterborough were less likely to reoffend, based on significant differences in important predictors including age, age at first offence, number of previous convictions and number of previous custodial sentences. There were also significant differences in the type of offences for which sentences were being served. As these factors all affect the likelihood of further offending, such differences should be controlled and understood before a comparison between Cohort 1 and the Comparison Group can be drawn. The PSM methodology was chosen to control for these factors. Details: Leicester, UK: University of Leicester, 2014. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 13, 2017 at: http://mcnevaluation.co.uk/wpfb-file/2014-moj-peterboough-social-impact-bond-final-report-on-cohort-1-analysis-pdf/ Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://mcnevaluation.co.uk/wpfb-file/2014-moj-peterboough-social-impact-bond-final-report-on-cohort-1-analysis-pdf/ Shelf Number: 144460 Keywords: Adult Offenders (U.K.) Prisoner Reentry Recidivism Reconviction Social Impact BondsSocial Services |